PIF System Level Findings: Clientism

01/10/2019

This leads me to describe the fifth quirk in our system.

I am still exploring this quirk using a combination of political theory and research on institutions. So far, it seems that either Ministers are incredibly powerful in the current system (possibly too powerful), or the chief executive’s fixed-term contracts have weakened senior officials’ place in the system.

Consider this.

First, the system is better at delivering in the short term than at delivering its core business effectively and efficiently over the medium-to-long term.

Second, there is no correlation between how an agency engages and works with its Minister and outcomes. But doing just that is where almost every agency gets a green rating (see below). Said differently, there is a disproportionate amount of effort and attention placed on working well with Ministers and meeting their needs.

I am not saying this is a bad thing. A good relationship with a Minister is proactive. It helps a Minister and a government refine their goals and preferences to expand their options, identify the right priorities, and mitigate risks. Additionally, a good relationship is an aide to good decisions as officials (and others) are more likely to offer free and frank advice inside a good relationship than in a deteriorating one.

However, it is possible to hypothesise that Ministers and officials are focused on a short-term and urgent game at the expense of the medium-term and more extended view in the public interest.

I am still musing about this one.

Te Rā Whakamana: Operational Capac …

Schick, then Ryan and Gill (2011), and Tenbensel et al (2026) This week, the series reads three pieces of local implementation scholarship alongside one another, written across the better part of three decades and from quite different vantage points. There is Allen Schick’s 1996 review of the reforms, and the warnings it carried. There is Bill Ryan and Derek Gill’s later account, written i...

Administrative Burden: The Woman …

When the State Designs for a Person Who Does Not Exist This is the fourth post in a series about what it actually costs to navigate the state. Last month, I examined how burdens fall hardest on the least resourced. I also introduced the research on “deservingness”. Today, I turn to gender. The hypothesis that the unpaid labour of navigating the state falls disproportionately on women, and ...

Loose Threads: The Other Allison

E te whānau. A longer Loose Thread this week, prompted by a moment in Beijing that has sent half the commentariat scrambling for their Thucydides. Graham Allison is having his moment in the foreign policy sun. But the Allison I want to talk about is the one almost nobody remembers. This post starts with his trap, notes who was already using it, and then turns to an argument about gover...