PIF System Level Findings: Clientism

This leads me to describe the fifth quirk in our system.

I am still exploring this quirk using a combination of political theory and research on institutions. So far, it seems that either Ministers are incredibly powerful in the current system (possibly too powerful), or the chief executive’s fixed-term contracts have weakened senior officials’ place in the system.

Consider this.

First, the system is better at delivering in the short term than at delivering its core business effectively and efficiently over the medium-to-long term.

Second, there is no correlation between how an agency engages and works with its Minister and outcomes. But doing just that is where almost every agency gets a green rating (see below). Said differently, there is a disproportionate amount of effort and attention placed on working well with Ministers and meeting their needs.

I am not saying this is a bad thing. A good relationship with a Minister is proactive. It helps a Minister and a government refine their goals and preferences to expand their options, identify the right priorities, and mitigate risks. Additionally, a good relationship is an aide to good decisions as officials (and others) are more likely to offer free and frank advice inside a good relationship than in a deteriorating one.

However, it is possible to hypothesise that Ministers and officials are focused on a short-term and urgent game at the expense of the medium-term and more extended view in the public interest.

​I am still musing about this one.