Beyond Westminster? 2024 Edition Hineraumati

30/12/2024

Since 2000, I have been testing a hypothesis that our traditional, Westminster-derived model on which our polity is based is under strain. My instincts are that we are beyond Westminster. To evaluate that hypothesis, I use Rod Rhodes’ framework (2005), which emphasises the five key elements of parliamentary sovereignty, strong cabinet government, ministerial responsibility, party government, and institutionalised opposition. As annual reports are tabled and officials appear before the Select Committee each year, I systematically assess progress against each of Rhodes’ five elements.

My assessment draws on multiple sources of evidence to evaluate system performance. This includes analysis of annual reports presented at select committees, Office of the Auditor General reports, discussions with colleagues in governance and public administration, and progress of any commissions of inquiry. While inherently subjective, this approach provides a structured way to assess system performance over time.

2020-2024 Assessment

Over the five years from 2020 to 2024, Aotearoa New Zealand’s Westminster system shows significant variations across its core elements.

Parliamentary sovereignty with unity of executive and legislature has maintained consistently strong performance, indicated by steady green ratings throughout the period. This suggests the fundamental relationship between the executive and legislative branches remains robust, even through changes in government. This should not be surprising because the executive is drawn from the legislature.

The opposition’s role as a recognised executive-in-waiting has shown notable fluctuation. While predominantly rated orange, indicating ongoing challenges, it experienced a brief improvement to green in 2022 before returning to orange. Most recently, in 2024, it has shown improvement again to green. This should also not be surprising: the outgoing government usually has a tough few years in opposition until they can demonstrate they are ready to take the Treasury benches. I assess this element as returning to green earlier than usual. That said, this critical democratic function experiences volatility and the question it raises is whether political parties can mitigate this volatility.

The concentration of political power in a collective and responsible cabinet presents an interesting pattern of variation. Starting strong with green ratings in 2020, it experienced some uncertainty in 2021 and faced challenges in 2022 (shifting to orange) before recovering to green in 2023. However, 2024 returns to orange, indicating ongoing tensions in maintaining collective cabinet responsibility under the current coalition arrangements. I have rated it orange this year because of the confusion over the Treaty Principles Bill, and in particular, how and why the collective resources of the state have been put behind a Bill that the Cabinet does not believe in and will not support through the House.

Ministerial accountability to Parliament has remained problematic, maintaining an orange rating throughout all five years. This persistent amber warning suggests structural challenges in maintaining effective ministerial oversight and accountability mechanisms, regardless of which party holds power. This consistency in rating indicates systemic issues rather than party-specific challenges.

Perhaps most concerning is the trajectory of constitutional bureaucracy and public service independence. Starting from a positive position in 2020, this element has shown steady deterioration, ultimately reaching and maintaining a red rating in 2023 and 2024. This sustained critical rating suggests serious and ongoing challenges to maintaining an independent, non-partisan public service – a fundamental pillar of the Westminster system that appears to be under increasing strain. That said, I rated this less red in 2024 than in 2023. That is because of the appointment of the three central agencies chief executives.*

2024 Element-by-Element Assessment

Parliamentary Sovereignty with Unity of Executive and Legislature (GREEN)
Current Status: Effective

• Strong performance in legislative process management
• Some new and effective parliamentary procedures under the new government
• Maintained a focus on results despite coalition complexity

Key Evidence:

• Smooth legislative program implementation: albeit with a lot of use of urgency
• Effective coalition management processes in the House
• Clear parliamentary majority maintenance
• Lumpy navigation of multi-party dynamics: with a focus on silos – not the cross-portfolio issues
• Heavy reliance on one select committee

Opposition Acting as Recognized Executive in Waiting (GREEN)
Current Status: Improved

• Enhanced opposition effectiveness
• Strong alternative policy development
• Effective parliamentary scrutiny
• Professional shadow cabinet operation

Key Evidence:

• Some robust question time performance
• Some alternative policy proposals are emerging
• Effective select committee participation as a block
• More substantial media presence and public engagement

Concentration of Political Power (ORANGE)
Current Status: Challenges Present

• Coalition dynamics affecting cabinet cohesion
• Complex power-sharing arrangements
• Stress on collective responsibility
• Policy coordination challenges

Key Evidence:

• Coalition partner public disagreements
• Complex decision-making processes
• Multiple power centres are emerging
• Coordination challenges visible

Ministerial Accountability to Parliament (ORANGE)
Current Status: Ongoing Issues

• Persistent accountability gaps
• Complex delegation chains
• Information quality concerns, especially on performance information reported to Parliament
• Oversight and transparency challenges

Key Evidence:

• Incomplete responses to parliamentary questions
• Slow responses to written parliamentary questions
• Significant quality issues in performance reporting
• Complex accountability relationships
• Delegation clarity problems
• Unperforming ministers who use personal narratives to avoid ministerial accountability

Constitutional Bureaucracy (LIGHT RED)
Current Status: Critical Concerns

• Serious independence challenges
• Politicization concerns
• Expertise retention issues
• Strategic capacity questions

Key Evidence:

• Increased use of evidentially political appointments
• Public service turnover
• Reduced policy capability
• Strategic advice quality concerns

The Westminster system in Aotearoa New Zealand presents a complex picture of resilience and vulnerability in 2024.

On the positive side, our core democratic foundations remain robust. Parliamentary sovereignty continues to function effectively, with the legislature maintaining its essential role despite the challenges of coalition government.

The opposition has found its footing, demonstrating increased effectiveness in its scrutiny role and policy alternative development. Perhaps most encouragingly, the basic machinery of democracy – from legislative processes to parliamentary procedures – continues to operate smoothly and efficiently.

However, beneath this surface stability, several critical issues demand attention. The concerning state of public service independence is most pressing, where growing politicisation threatens the fundamental principle of a neutral, professional bureaucracy.

Coalition management has become increasingly complex, testing the limits of our governmental frameworks and challenging traditional concepts of collective responsibility. Our accountability mechanisms, while functional, show signs of strain, particularly in the clarity and effectiveness of ministerial oversight.

Adding to these concerns is a noticeable decline in policy capability across the public sector, potentially compromising the quality of advice and implementation.

These immediate challenges exist within a broader context of structural pressures that continue to reshape our governance landscape. The ongoing adaptation to MMP, now decades old but still evolving, requires constantly refining our political processes. International obligations increasingly constrain domestic policy choices, while governance arrangements grow more complex with each iteration of coalition government. The public sector faces mounting pressure for reform, caught between traditional Westminster principles and modern governance requirements.

Looking forward, several immediate actions appear critical. Strengthening public service independence protections and enhanced ministerial accountability mechanisms must be prioritised. Coalition coordination processes need refinement to ensure effective governance while maintaining collective responsibility. Policy capability across the public sector requires urgent reinforcement. In the medium term, more fundamental reforms beckon: a comprehensive review of accountability frameworks, development of robust coalition governance guidelines, significant enhancement of public service capacity, and strengthened parliamentary oversight mechanisms.

The path ahead requires careful navigation between preserving the essential strengths of our Westminster heritage and adapting to contemporary governance needs. Success will depend on our ability to implement these reforms while maintaining the democratic foundations that have served us well. The challenge lies in identifying these needs – as this assessment does – and finding the political will and public service capability to implement them effectively.

There is an additional challenge that I will cover in a summer post: Is it time to integrate Te Tiriti o Waitangi formally into this assessment framework? I will make that argument over raumati – I welcome your thoughts.

*No, neither the Social Investment agency nor the Regulation Ministry are central agencies – period.

Nau mai haere mai Hine Raumati. He iti tangata e tupu – he iti toki e iti tonu.

Rhodes, R. A. W. (2005). Is Westminster dead in Westminster (and why should we care)? ANZSOG-ANU Public Lecture series, Canberra, 23 February. And Rhodes, R. A. W., John Wanna, and Patrick Weller, Comparing Comparing Westminster (Oxford, 2009; online edn, Oxford Academic, 1 Sept. 2009).