A persistent and enduring problem
01/12/2017
The ‘public policy cycle’ is a familiar concept. It is often presented as a rational decision-making model, supported by tools and evidence.
While the terminology shifts slightly across organisations, the pattern is usually the same.
Problems are identified and analysed to decide whether intervention is justified. A response is then designed, usually drawing on a wide range of policy tools, sometimes with options appraisal to weigh up alternatives. A preferred option is selected, typically at the political or executive level, followed by agreement to implementation and some monitoring. Eventually, there is a commitment to evaluate.
After more than twenty years working with this model, in practice, as an academic and as a coach, I now see it for what it really is: a useful but idealised and positivist view of public policy. It is good for explaining the basics, but it is not a serious account of how good policy is made.
And yet, it still dominates some policy shops.
This raises an obvious question: why?
My working theory is that many of these shops are led by people who frame policy through principal-agent theory and are shaped by managerialist thinking.
Their focus is on finding the technically ‘correct’ policy tool rather than engaging with the messier but vital dynamics of context.
They look for the answer, rather than investing in the craft of positioning, leveraging, and working with others.
They seek technical precision over the diversity of thought needed to solve shared problems.
They often ignore past experience. Casual empiricism dominates, privileging control and internal certainty over the lived and collective knowledge available from the system itself.
In doing so, they trade the responsibility of leading the hard but necessary work of shaping strategic conversations with senior officials, Cabinet, and Parliament, for the comfort of a well-written brief.
This is not how international practice is evolving. The OECD, EU, and Whitehall have spent the past decade challenging the idea that policy is simply about finding the right technical answer. They have deliberately shifted away from privileging technical models over context, conversation, and engagement.
Meanwhile, a small number of domestic shops remain stuck, still working in ways that were already dated ten years ago.
Perhaps this is one reason why politicians, from all sides, are increasingly turning to external advisors.
He tohe puruhi.
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