Proposed Amendments Public Service Act (2020): Back to Basics? Rethinking Accountability in Aotearoa’s Public Service

20/05/2025

This series examines the Government’s proposed reforms to the Public Service Act 2020. The direction is promising: a shift toward simpler accountability, clearer roles, and stronger responsiveness after years of drift. But there are risks. The challenge is to restore democratic clarity without tipping into overcorrection. Over the coming posts, I’ll unpack each Cabinet paper in turn — what the Government gets right, where they have gone too far, and what Parliament should be asking before these reforms are locked in.

As promised, this series examines the Government’s recent proposals to amend the Public Service Act 2020. I think the changes are heading in the right direction. But there are also risks. So the goal here is to explain why the reforms matter, what they get right, and what we need to watch.

For readers wanting to dive deeper into how we got here, I’ve written a comprehensive background piece that traces the journey from rangatiratanga to modern reforms. It’s not essential reading for this series, but it’ll give you the historical context if that’s your thing.

Let’s get into it. Let me set the contemporary context for you before we do a deep dive into each paper.

The Public Service Act of 2020 was introduced with high ambitions. It aimed to modernise Aotearoa’s public sector by introducing new duties around stewardship, collaboration, diversity, and long-term thinking.

These additions sounded reasonable on paper. But almost straight away, the results were mixed. Clarity gave way to complexity. Lines of accountability blurred. Chief executives found themselves juggling legal obligations that didn’t always point in the same direction. The system got slower, not better.

This drift became even more visible during the COVID-19 response, especially the second national lockdown. While many New Zealanders could not work at all, particularly those in frontline, casual, or service roles, public servants stayed home and kept working remotely. The impression left on the public was stark: one group held secure jobs, kept income flowing, and later even awarded itself medals, while others bore the full weight of economic shutdowns, especially in central, south, and west Auckland.

This disconnect reinforced the perception that Wellington existed in a bubble, detached from everyday realities. In my view, the current Government’s electoral success was partly built on promising to address this perceived injustice. Public trust in government institutions eroded during this period, creating a widening gap between bureaucracy and community. That trust is only now beginning to be carefully and quietly rebuilt.

To be clear, I know this perception doesn’t reflect reality, especially for those delivering essential services on the front lines. The problem was more about communication than performance. Without compelling stories about what the public service was actually achieving, taxpayers were left wondering what value they were getting for their hard-earned contributions to the state. The narrative vacuum was filled with scepticism.

However, the complexity introduced by the 2020 Act did not help the service. It diminished the clear lines of ministerial accountability and responsiveness that had been the strength of the earlier State Sector Act of 1988. That legislation, despite its age, clearly aligned public service responsibilities with ministerial priorities. While criticised by some as too instrumental, its simplicity and clarity gave governments the tools to translate electoral mandates into practical action.

Also the 2020 Act went much further that the 1988 Act. It gave the public service a more explicit role in determining the public interest and facilitating active citizenship. This blurred the boundary between political mandate and administrative role. It positioned officials as co-owners of democratic legitimacy, rather than as servants of it. In practice, and in my opinion, this is what undermined clarity about who was answerable to whom, and why.

Of course, the 1988 Act wasn’t perfect either. Its sharp edges meant it had its problems. It had aged. As newer models of public sector governance layered themselves over the top, fragmentation set in, and compliance costs followed. The principal–agent incentives were so strong that collaboration often led to confusion and frustration. But at least it was clear who was responsible for what, unlike today’s somewhat muddled accountability.

So it is in this context the Cabinet’s recent proposals to reform the Public Service Act deserve serious consideration. By emphasising simpler accountability, clearer roles, and greater responsiveness, they promise to restore a crucial balance: a balance where elected representatives, accountable directly to voters, have the capability and clarity to guide public institutions effectively. After years of increasing complexity, these reforms aim to return to basics.

But while the direction is welcome, it comes with responsibilities. These reforms must be accompanied by stronger parliamentary oversight, clearer lines of accountability, and a serious commitment to transparency and public trust. Getting the balance right will be critical. Like it or not, the public sector system is plural and networked, not a one-person carriage ride where ministers can issue commands and expect everyone to obey. Governance doesn’t work like that in the real world, let alone in the public sector. In the public sector, it’s a complex system of relationships, consent, trust, and shared responsibility. Ask those Prime Ministers who were good at governance – they understood that if you push it too far, things fall apart – not all at once, but piece by piece, until it’s hard to tell what broke first, and suddenly you are unelectable.

Over the next few days, I’ll tackle each Cabinet paper in turn:

First, the paper that clarifies the roles and responsibilities of the public service: I will cover what it restores, what it risks, and what Parliament should ask before giving it the green light.

Then, a closer look at the performance agenda, especially the shift in how chief executives are appointed, managed, and held to account, and whether this will deliver better services. This is my favourite paper. The analysis is good, and the advice is sound.

After that, the third paper on cross-agency coordination and breaking down silos: where the gains might be, and where the system might overcorrect (as it tends to do).

The final piece will turn to the Regulatory Standards Bill, which, despite its language of clarity and discipline, risks undoing the very coherence these reforms are trying to build.

The first one drops tomorrow.