Hypothesis: real public sector reform needs political leadership and a focus on ethics

I’m not posting that much at the moment. I am writing. But this hypothesis above has my attention.

Let me examine the crucial dynamic between political and administrative spheres in public sector reform.

The Better Public Services program offers an instructive example of how the political-administrative interface should work. Its success wasn’t just about managerial efficiency – it demonstrated what’s possible when there’s genuine trust and collaboration in the ‘purple zone’ between ministers and officials.

The current dysfunction, particularly in cases like officials collaborating with Todd Stephenson on te reo Māori policy, reveals a dangerous erosion of the ‘purple zone’. Specifically, when public servants bypass ministers and engage in a backbencher’s political agenda rather than serving the executive government, it’s not just an ethical breach—it’s a symptom of institutional breakdown.

My observation is that perpetual campaigning is displacing effective delivery. The challenge isn’t just administrative competence—it’s about political capability. When ministers get caught up in the social media cycle and partisan politics rather than addressing complex policy challenges, it creates a vacuum in executive leadership that can distort the entire system.

The state care royal commission response is a particularly telling example. When a minister’s personal narrative overshadows the actual policy work, it doesn’t just affect that specific issue—it can paralyse entire areas of government activity. This illustrates how weak ministerial capability can undermine even the most competent public service.

The bilateral relationship between politicians and bureaucrats requires both sides to maintain their distinct roles. Public servants must provide free and frank advice while maintaining political neutrality, and ministers must manage political pressures while focusing on executive delivery.

The entire system suffers when either side fails to maintain these boundaries, whether officials engage in partisan politics or ministers prioritise daily political wins over implementation.

Without strong party structures grounded in community connections, we risk having ministers who cannot manage complex policy challenges. This isn’t just about individual competence – it’s about the institutional capacity to develop political leadership that effectively engages with the bureaucracy.

The core insight underpinning I hypothesise is that public sector reform isn’t just about administrative systems but the quality of the political-administrative relationship. Without competent ministers who can create space for implementation and ensure their parties respect the Westminster guardrails and officials who understand their constitutional role, even the best-designed reforms will fail.

For meaningful reform, we need both sides: politicians capable of rising above daily political games to focus on delivery and public servants who understand their role is to support executive government, not engage in partisan politics.

Anything less risks turning reform efforts into mere administrative theatre while real problems go unsolved.