Loose Threads: The Purple Zone

Where the blue of politics and the red of administration meet, and what that space asks of free and frank advice

I return to the purple zone because it names the institutional space where political and administrative authority meet in practice, and because the way successive governments have rebuilt that space tells us something about why free and frank advice has never been defined. Howard Fancy and Alex Matheson gave the space its name in November 1995, describing the territory where the blue of politics and the red of administration blend into something that formal organisational charts rarely capture (Fancy & Matheson, 1995). In this post I want to do three things: first, set out where the purple zone came from; second, trace how successive governments in Aotearoa built, reworked and thinned the machinery that sits inside it; and third, consider what that history suggests about the content of free and frank advice.

Where the purple zone came from

Traditional public administration theory rests on a distinction between political and administrative roles, in which politicians make value judgements and policy decisions while administrators carry those decisions out through neutral, professional expertise, and that distinction has shaped how we think about government for more than a century. In my experience, the distinction tends to give way at predictable moments in every advisory relationship: a proposal that looks technical turns political, a political decision turns out to depend on implementation expertise, or an official’s judgement runs against a minister’s instincts. The public service bargain, the largely unwritten understanding about what ministers and officials owe one another (Hood & Lodge, 2006), has to become operational somewhere, and the purple zone is the name for that somewhere.

The reforms of the 1980s made the limits of the dichotomy plain to those working inside the State Services Commission. In separating purchaser from provider and policy from operations, the reforms produced what Matheson described as “problems of co-ordination” and left departments with “a very short planning horizon” (Matheson, 1998, p. 352). The purple zone emerged in response, evolving rather than being designed, as a group of central agency officials worked through the flaws in the reforms and the need to support collective decision-making more effectively. In Matheson’s account, it grew out of “a combination of frustration with a blinkered and over specified performance regime and the desire to explore the new freedom” (Matheson, 1998, p. 352), which in my reading makes it as much a product of practice as of policy.

The deliberative policy literature makes a related point from a different direction, observing that officials make choices with political implications whenever they interpret policy, allocate resources or deal with stakeholders, and that politicians become involved in administrative detail whenever they try to see their policies carried through (Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003). The purple zone is the place where those two realities can no longer be kept apart, where political judgement and administrative expertise have to be brought together, and where, in my view, free and frank advice does most of its work.

How the machinery was built, reworked and thinned

Matheson’s work, first with Fancy and then with Gerald Scanlan and Ross Tanner, located the central challenge of the purple zone in bringing political and administrative roles together well rather than in keeping them apart, a task that calls for capabilities different from either political leadership or administrative management alone (Fancy & Matheson, 1995; Matheson et al., 1996). Aotearoa developed specific instruments for that task in the 1990s: Strategic Result Areas that crossed portfolio boundaries, Key Result Areas that anchored departmental contributions to them, and an ongoing strategic dialogue between ministers and officials carried through strategic intention and monitoring documents (Matheson, 1998). The Prime Minister of the day described the aim as “a strategic governor” (Matheson, 1998, p. 353), a link between political direction and administrative operation that neither a return to centralisation nor an acceptance of fragmentation could supply.

The Strategic and Key Result Areas of the Bolger and Shipley governments did something that, from where I sit, deserves more attention than it has received: they included explicit targets for reducing disparities between Māori and non-Māori, placing the obligations of article three of Te Tiriti inside the purple zone’s coordinating machinery. For officials advising on any significant initiative, that machinery made certain questions mandatory, and it changed what counted as complete advice, and with it what counted as free and frank advice.

The Clark government reworked that architecture, first through the Social Report and later through the Families Young and Old framework, which organised the purple zone around stages of the life course in a way that was innovative by international standards. The reworking came with a loss, because the explicit focus on reducing disparities between Māori and non-Māori fell away, and the coordinating machinery carried on without it. In my reading, advice under the Clark arrangements was no less free and frank than before; it was framed around a different set of priorities, and closing the gaps between Māori and non-Māori was no longer among them.

The Key and English governments extended the machinery considerably, through the Better Public Services result areas, the Performance Improvement Framework, four-year plans that brought budget and workforce planning together, costing tools that benchmarked back-office spending across the system, the Whānau Ora outcomes framework as a cross-government instrument and Gateway reviews as structured checkpoints for significant investments, which continue today. I count none of these as purely technical management tools, because each was a purple zone instrument designed to match political priorities with administrative capability across longer timeframes and several agencies, and to build confidence between the political and administrative authorising environments through performance assurance. Within twenty years, what Matheson had described as a strategic conversation between ministers and officials had grown into an elaborate set of instruments reaching well beyond the relationship between a single minister and a single department.

That growth carried a cost. Research brought together by Derek Gill found “an ‘iron cage’ of control based on performance measurement” (Gill, 2011, p. 3), a finding carried into the wider argument of Future State (Ryan & Gill, 2011), and accountability documents such as the Statement of Intent could “quickly become irrelevant to changing ministerial requirements” (Dormer, 2011, p. 188) while the system continued to demand them. The purple zone, in other words, had built a performance cage of its own, and I read that as a warning about how easily instruments meant to support a conversation can come to replace it.

The Ardern government elected in 2017 took a different course, setting aside or simplifying much of the machinery and making the cross-agency instruments, and many of the outcome and impact measures, less visible. What remained was a focused goal of reducing child poverty within a wider language of wellbeing, a worthy objective that now operated without most of the supporting infrastructure built over the preceding decades, leaving political will with fewer administrative means of carrying it through. The purple zone under the Ardern and Hipkins governments was simpler, and in my view thinner, less able to give ministers either a performance account or an outcomes account at election time, and the structured settings in which certain kinds of free and frank advice had been procedurally expected began to fade.

What the history suggests about free and frank advice

The purple zone also rests on relationships as much as on instruments, and the earliest observers saw this clearly. Writing on the Australian adaptation of the concept, Shergold suggested that “success, I suspect, will depend less upon applying a contractual framework to the respective roles and responsibilities of minister and Secretary/chief executive than upon establishing an effective working relationship between them” (Shergold, 1997, p. 304). A colloquy of public administration practitioners in 1996 reached a similar view, agreeing that joint and overlapping responsibilities in a political environment tend to produce tensions, opportunities for passing the blame and difficulty in assigning it, and that working in such a space calls for “keen consciences” and “a capacity to explain the subtleties of the situation to an inherently suspicious public” (Jonathan Boston, as reported in Elliot, 1998, p. 83). In my reading, this relational character helps explain why neither the purple zone nor free and frank advice can be regulated into existence.

The history above also shows that what counts as complete advice changes with the configuration of the purple zone. Under Bolger and Shipley, advice on a significant initiative that left out the reduction of Māori disparities was inadequate as well as incomplete; under Clark’s life-course framework, a different set of questions became mandatory; under Key and English, performance assurance and cross-agency coordination became expected elements; and under Ardern and Hipkins, a simpler framing built around wellbeing prevailed. An official giving free and frank advice in 1997 tended to face different questions from one doing so in 2007, 2017 or today, even if the qualities we associate with such advice, its fullness, its candour, its professional judgement and its grounding in evidence, stayed broadly constant.

This leads me to think that the absence of a definition of free and frank advice may be closer to practical wisdom than to a failure of clarity. A fixed definition would risk freezing the concept into one configuration of the purple zone, when each government reworks that space to suit its priorities and its philosophy of governing, and the openness of the concept appears to be what allows it to remain meaningful across those changes. Too much machinery produces an iron cage, and too little leaves political will without administrative capability behind it, but in either case ministers still need free and frank advice, and the concept’s resistance to definition is, for the most part, what lets it carry across that whole range.

Matheson’s own summary was that “a critical element in coherent government policy was the understanding amongst the key players of the intended direction of the whole” (Matheson, 1998, p. 357), and the purple zone, on that account, is where a strategic conversation builds shared meaning without requiring a single agreed definition. What remains to be understood is what it is like to work there day after day, and Rose Cole’s (2022) study of portfolio private secretaries in ministerial offices is, in my view, the best place to begin.

R: Cole, R. (2022). Purple zone practitioners: Portfolio private secretaries in New Zealand ministerial offices [Doctoral dissertation, Victoria University of Wellington].
R: Dormer, R. (2011). Findings and cross-cutting themes from the case study research. In D. Gill (Ed.), The iron cage recreated: The performance management of state organisations in New Zealand (pp. 145–190). Institute of Policy Studies.
R: Elliot, R. (1998). Professional developments: Exploring the purple zone. Public Administration and Development, 18(1), 81–84.
R: Fancy, H., & Matheson, A. (1995, November). Future directions in public management in New Zealand: Towards strategic management [Paper presentation]. Public Sector Convention, Wellington, New Zealand.
R: Gill, D. (Ed.). (2011). The iron cage recreated: The performance management of state organisations in New Zealand. Institute of Policy Studies.
R: Hajer, M. A., & Wagenaar, H. (Eds.). (2003). Deliberative policy analysis: Understanding governance in the network society. Cambridge University Press.
R: Hood, C., & Lodge, M. (2006). The politics of public service bargains: Reward, competency, loyalty and blame. Oxford University Press.
R: Matheson, A. (1998). Governing strategically: The New Zealand experience. Public Administration and Development, 18(4), 349–363.
R: Matheson, A., Scanlan, G., & Tanner, R. (1996). Strategic management in government: Extending the reform model in New Zealand. State Services Commission.
R: Ryan, B., & Gill, D. (Eds.). (2011). Future state: Directions for public management in New Zealand. Victoria University Press.
R: Shergold, P. (1997). The colour purple: Perceptions of accountability across the Tasman. Public Administration and Development, 17(3), 293–306.